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CROSS-EMPLOYEE REDISTRIBUTION EFFECTS
OF MANDATED EMPLOYEE BENEFITS
Sharon Rabin-Margalioth*

I. OVERVIEW

Mandated employee benefits ("mandates") offer an attractive
alternative to policy makers. The popularity of these benefits is
obviously not a function of actual wealth redistribution from employers
to employees, as none exists, but is due to their political feasibility.
Some mandated employee benefits finance social programs such as
health insurance, unemployment insurance and disability insurance.
Alternative financing mechanisms would be hard to advance politically
because they would require additional explicit taxes. The benefits of the
mandates are highly visible and it is clear to workers that they receive
the benefit.' However, the benefits have the virtue of hidden costs
because they do not appear as government expenditures and because few
employees lose their jobs after their implementation.
Are these schemes equitable from the intra-employee standpoint?
The redistributive consequences of mandated benefits among groups of
workers, vis-a-vis themselves, has received scant attention.2
The objective of this paper is to discuss the intra-employee redistribution
effects of mandated employee benefit policies. The thrust of the
argument is that mandates involuntarily imposes dual labor market
practices on labor market participants. These practices further entail
* Assistant Professor, Radzyner School of Law, Interdisciplinary Center (IDC), Herzliya;
Visiting Researcher, N.Y.U. School of Law. I thank Samuel Estreicher for helpful comments on this
paper. I also acknowledge help from workshop participants at the Labor and Employment Law
Center at New York University School of Law.
1. Alan B. Krueger, Observations on Employment-Based Government Mandates, with
Particular Reference to Health Insurance, in LABOR MARKETS, EMPLOYMENT POLICY, AND JOB
CREATION 297 (Lewis C. Solmon & Alec R. Levenson eds., 1994) (discussing why employee
mandated benefits programs fair well with policymakers); Lawrence H. Summers, Some Simple
Economics of Mandated Benefits, 79 AM. ECON. REV. 177 (1989) (explaining why in the political
apparatus mandates are a second best alternative for both conservatives and liberals).
2. See infra note 61.
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regressive redistribution outcomes, in which external labor market
employees are partially subsidizing the provision of the mandated
benefits to internal market employees.
This paper draws heavily on the distinction between fixed versus
variable labor costs and the dual labor market theory. The claim is that
many employee benefits mandates, whether legislated or judicially
enforced, are of a fixed-cost nature. This means that the cost of
providing the benefit does not vary with the wage rate, but rather with
the number of employees. Mandates impose no additional costs once an
employee is covered; regardless of how many hours she is putting in, or
her hourly wage. Fixed cost mandates are sensitive to the size of the
workforce rather than employee wages. Such mandates may induce
firms to employ fewer workers and work them more hours, and increase
the demand for higher compensated employees, for vhom the provision
of the benefit is cheaper relative to the wage rates. On the other hand, a
countervailing incentive arises when mandates exempt certain categories
of workers;3 mandates may cause an upward shift in demand for
employees in the uncovered sector.
An increased demand for extended work schedules in the covered
sector and highly compensated workers coupled with an increase in
demand for employees in the exempt sector, are two forces which aid in
the preservation of a segmented labor market. The internal labor market
job holders enjoy fairly stable jobs, high wages and generous benefit
packages, while others are forced into external labor market jobs, with
lower wages and less benefits.
The dual labor market theory is by no means a new one.
The existence of internal primary labor markets operating side by side

3. All mandates entail exemptions. Some exemptions relate to the size of the establishment:
See, e.g., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 164, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2000) (exempting small

businesses employing less than fifteen employees; Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) of 1993,
29 U.S.C. § 2611(2)(B) (1994) (exempting employers with less than fifty employees); Worker
Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act (WARN), 29 U.S.C. § 2101(a)(1) (1994) (exempting
employers with less than 100 employees). Other exemptions depend on the type of employment
arrangements: See, e.g., Fair Labor Standard Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (1994) (exempting
certain occupations and industries from coverage); FMLA, 29 U.S.C. § 2611(2)(A) (1994)
(exempting employees working less than twelve months and less than 1,250 hours in a twelve
month period). An exemption can also be defined in compliance terms. From an economical
perspective, if a mandate is not enforced in certain industries or geographical regions, this is
equivalent to a legislative exemption because employers are not complying with the requirements of
the mandate and will not incur the extra labor costs.
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with external secondary labor markets is well documented.4 The role of
mandated benefits, however, in contributing to this phenomenon has not
been highlighted. In the account that follows, dual market structures are
imposed involuntarily on the parties, via regulation. This is in contrast to
the traditional assumption that organizations turn to internal labor
market settings voluntarily to overcome specific deficiencies pertaining
to investment in training, asymmetric information, risk aversion and
transaction costs. 5
To the extent that mandated benefits promote the formation or
growth of dual labor markets, compensating wage differential theory
suggests that there are no intra-employee distributional distortions. 6
Under this view, employees in the uncovered sector would simply be
compensated with higher wages on account of their not enjoying the
advantages of the mandates, thus leaving total compensation fairly
equal.7 This means that a sorting process is taking place. Workers who
value the mandated benefit less drop out of the covered sector and hold
exempt jobs, which do not provide the benefit but pay such employees
higher wages. Unfortunately, empirical data suggests the opposite.8
Not only do uncovered employees lack the protection of the mandates,
these employees are not compensated with higher wages.9
Concerns often have been raised over the regressive redistribution
effects of internal labor markets. For example, individuals holding
internal labor market jobs tend to earn more and receive more favorable
benefit packages than their secondary market counterparts. '
4. For an excellent survey of the economic incentives to promote internal markets, see
generally Michael L. Wachter & Randall D. Wright, The Economics of Internal Labor Markets, 29
INDUS. REL. 240 (1990).
5. id. at 244-52.
6. Compensating wage differential theory claims that given identical employees and jobs,
employee compensation should be equal. Therefore, if there are two identical workers in identical
jobs and one is provided health insurance, the worker without health insurance will receive higher
wages. See Melissa Famulari & Marilyn E. Manser, Employer-Provided Benefits: Employer Cost
Versus Employee Value, H 2 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 24, 27 (1989).
7. Id. Measuring wage differences is the goal of hedonic price measurements. The wage
differential between covered and uncovered employees represents the value of the benefit to the
covered employee. See Sherwin Rosen, Hedonic Prices and hnplicit Markets: Product
Differentiation in Pure Competition, 82 J. POL. ECON. 34 (1974).
8. See studies discussed infra notes 151-159.
9. See discussion infra Part IV.D.
10. PETER B. DOERINGER & MICHAEL J. PIORE, INTERNAL LABOR MARKETS AND
MANPOWER ANALYSIS 165 (1971). This is one of the early works that addresses the efficiency
aspects of dual labor practices and stresses heavily that a segmented labor market is not equitable.
Workers in secondary markets tend to have poorer working conditions, less protection against
arbitrary treatment by the employer, higher turnover rates and fewer benefits and opportunities for
advancement. Id. The unionized versus non-unionized comparison of compensation packages yields
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Prior research assumed that the adoption of internal labor market
employment practices were the result of voluntary actions, such as the
product of market forces, and not an outcome of regulation." However,
if mandated benefits are shifting employment relationships into dual
market settings, then the regulatory process itself is aiding in the
disparate allocation of jobs within the two labor markets. It therefore can
no longer be claimed that regressive redistribution is the mere side effect
of the firm's efficient decision of how to construct the employment
relationship.
This article will, in Section II, briefly explain employee-mandated
benefits. Section III describes why employment mandates, contrary to
common intuition, do not redistribute wealth from employers to
employees. Section IV analyzes the intra-employee distributional effects
of mandates. Finally, section V offers some preliminary conclusions.
II. WHAT ARE MANDATED BENEFITS?
Broadly defined, mandated employee benefits are any form of
mandatory
non-wage
compensation
required
by regulation.
These include benefits such as employer-provided health insurance ,12
unpaid medical leave, 3 workers' compensation, 4 unemployment
insurance,'5 safety and health standards,' 6 uniform standards for
employee pension and benefit plans, 7 antidiscrimination mandates, 8

similar conclusions. See RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JAMES L. MEDOFF, WHAT Do UNIONS Do? 59,
77 (1984) (analyzing the wage and benefit gap between the two sectors). Unionized establishments
representing the internal market settings are characterized by voluntary benefit schemes, job
security protection clauses and internal promotion ladders. Total compensation is more generous in
the unionized sector than in the non-unionized sector. Id.
I1. See Wachter & Wright, supra note 4, at 240-42.
12. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 393-11 (1985). Hawaii is the only state that mandates
employer provided health insurance.
13. See Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) of 1993, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (1994).
The FMLA entitles employees to take up to twelve weeks of unpaid job-protected leave for
specified family and medical reasons, such as the birth or adoption of a child or illness in the family.
Id. § 2612(a)(1).
14. Workers' compensation insurance provides cash payments and medical benefits to
workers who incur a work-related injury or illness. These mandates are state-based.
15. See Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-504 (1994) (providing for federal old age,
survivors and disability insurance benefits and grants to states for unemployment compensation).
16. See Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) of 1990, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1994)
(requiring employers to furnish each employee with employment and a workplace free from
recognized hazards that can cause death or serious physical harm).
17. See Employee Retirement and Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 10011461 (1994) (establishing uniform standards for employee pension and welfare benefit plans,
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protection against unjust dismissal' 9 and advanced notification in the
case of plant closing.20 Regulation can either be the product of legislation
or judicially introduced; a dominant example of the latter is the common
law exceptions to the employment at-will doctrine.2
All mandated benefits operate in the same manner. They require the
employer to provide covered employees with certain benefits.
These benefits are typically non-waivable in that the parties (employer
and employee) generally cannot contract around them. Moreover, they
must be provided, regardless of the employees' actual preferences.
Mandated benefits increase the employer's labor costs, and there is at
least the possibility that some or all of these higher costs will be passed
onto employees through lower wages.
Minimum wage does not fit within the definition of a mandated
benefit.22 As a wage mandate, minimum wage translates into additional
labor costs. However, minimum wage is treated separately because labor
cost increases associated with wage mandates cannot be passed to
incumbent employees through lower wages."
The significance of mandated employee benefits has been
increasing.24 According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics' (BLS)
Employer Costs for Employee Compensation (ECEC), by March 1999,
non-wage compensation represented 27.5% of total compensation of
U.S. workers.25 Overall there was an increase of 55.3% from 1989 to
including minimum participation accrual and vesting requirements, fiduciary responsibilities and
reporting and disclosure duties).
18. The following are the major federal antidiscrimination mandates: Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§
2000e to 2000e-17 (2000); Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634
(1994); Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994). ,
19. Montana is the only state to legislate an employment just cause dismissal protection
mandate. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-904 (2000) (mandating a cause of action for any employee who
completed the employer's probationary period and was discharged either in violation of the
employer's written policies or without good cause).
20. See Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act (WARN), 29 U.S.C. §§ 21012109 (1994) (requiring employers to give sixty days notice of plant closings to their employees and
state and local officials).
21. See discussion of judicial mandates infra Part IV.C.2.
22. Minimum wage is mandated by the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201219 (1994).
23. See infra Part IV.E.
24. See David Weil, Implementing Employment Regulation: Insights on the Determinants of
Regulatory Performance, in GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP 429,
433-35 (Bruce E. Kaufman ed., 1997) for a complete list of federal mandates. See Krueger, supra
note 1, for a discussion of why mandated employee benefits are endorsed by politicians to advance
social programs.
25. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BULLETIN 2526, EMPLOYER
COSTS FOR EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION, 1986-1999, at 2 (Mar. 2000) [hereinafter EMPLOYER
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September 2001 .2 This is only a rough measure of the role of mandated
benefits. On the one hand, the ECEC survey covers many voluntary
benefits27 and therefore overstates the effect of mandated benefits on
total compensation.28 On the other hand, the ECEC disregards the costs
of other mandates, such as antidiscrimination protection, unpaid leave,
job security and health and safety standards, thereby understating
employers' costs of complying with mandated benefits policies.
Nonetheless, these numbers give a rough sense of the magnitude of the
costs of providing employee benefits, mandated or not.
1II. DISTRIBUTIONAL EFFECTS OF MANDATED BENEFITS:
THE EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE MATRIX

In the past, the literature on the distributive impact of mandated
employee benefits policies has concentrated on the issue of whether
mandates can successfully transfer wealth from employers to their
employees .29 Ample theoretical and empirical analysis supports the claim
that such wealth transfers are normally unattainable. 0
The theoretical argument follows the price theory model and
suggests that employers will shift the cost of the mandates to their
employees, typically in the form of lower wages or a decreased rate of

The survey includes civilian workers (private industry and
state and local government employees.. Id. Total compensation averaged $20.29 per hour worked.
Id. Wages and salaries averaged $14.72 per hour worked and accounted for 72.5% of total
compensation. Id. Cost of benefits averaged $5.58 per hour worked. Id.
COSTS FOR EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION).

26. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, EMPLOYMENT COST INDEX (Oct.
2001) [hereinafter EMPLOYMENT COST INDEX].

27. The ECEC covers the following benefits: paid leave (vacation, holiday, sick and other)
representing 6.6% of total compensation; supplementary pay (premium pay for overtime holiday
pay and weekends, shift differential and nonproduction bonuses) representing 2.5% of total
compensation; insurance (life, health, and short and long term disability) representing 6.4% of total
compensation; retirement and savings (defined contributions and defined benefits plans)
representing 3.7% of total compensation; and legally required benefits (social security, federal
unemployment insurance, state unemployment insurance and workers compensation) representing
8.1% of total compensation. EMPLOYER COSTS FOR EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION supra note 25, at 2

tbl. 1.
28. Yet legally mandated benefits, i.e., social security, federal unemployment insurance, state
unemployment insurance and workers' compensation still accounted for 29.6% of the total benefit
compensation surveyed. Id.
29. See generally Summers, supra note 1; Dwight R. Lee, Why Workers Should Want
Mandated Benefits to Lower Their Wages, 34 ECON. INQUIRY 401 '(1996); Susan N. Houseman, The
Effects of Employer Mandates, in GENERATING JOBS: HOW TO INCREASE DEMAND FOR LESSSKILLED WORKERS 154 (Richard B. Freeman & Peter Gottschalk eds., 1998).

30. Summers, supra note 1, at 181; Lee, supra note 29, at 406; Houseman, supra note 29, at
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future wage boosts 3 If decreasing wage rates are impossible due to
restraints on wage, such as minimum wage laws or labor market wage
rigidities, employers will simply hire fewer employees 2 The expected
effect of the mandated benefits will be lower employment levels.3
According to the price theory model, significant cost shifting to
employees indicates that employees are attaching a high value to the
benefits provided and are willing to accept a wage cut inexchange.34
A high degree of cost shifting isassumed to indicate that the mandates
are efficient.35 Graph 1 illustrates the changes that. occur when a
mandated benefits program isintroduced:
Graph 1: The Impact of Mandated Benefits on the Labor Market
Wages
S

h
W

,,

f

g

D
D"
Employees

31. See, e.g., Houseman, supra note 29, at 184.
32. These basic points are emphasized using simple supply and demand graphs. See
Summers, supra note 1, at 180; Lee, supra note 29, at 402-05; Houseman, supra note 29, at 160.
33. See Lee, supra note 29, at 402; Houseman, supra note 29, at 160.
34. Lee, supra note 29, at 403-04.
35. This is the main point of Lee's paper. See generally Lee, supra note 28. Mandates initiate
a shift both in the demand and supply curves. The leftward shift in the demand curve represents the
cost to employers of providing the benefit. The rightward shift in the supply curve represents the
value attached to the mandate by the employees. The new intersection determines wages and
employment levels. As employees place higher value on the benefit relative to the cost to
employers, they will be willing to accept higher wage cuts. Sizeable wage cuts indicate that
employees are gaining from the benefit. Id. at 403-04. The same idea is advanced in relation to
consumer mandates in Richard Craswell, Passing On the Costs of Legal Rules: Efficiency and
Distribution in Buyer-Seller Relationships, 43 STAN. L. REV. 361, 372 (1990) ("Paradoxical as it
may seem, the rules whose costs are most heavily passed on are also the rules that will benefit
consumers the most.").
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S and D represent the supply and demand curves prior to the
implementation of the mandated benefit. 6 W and E represent the
corresponding wage and employment rate at that stage. When the
mandate is. introduced, the demand curve D" shifts leftward, the distance
(cd) representing the cost of providing the mandate to employers; the
supply curve S" shifts rightward, the distance (ab) representing the value
placed on the benefit by the marginal employees. In the specific graph
drawn, all employees place the same value on the benefit." This value is
greater than the employers' cost of providing the mandate (ab>cd),
therefore wages fall from W to W", but employment levels rise from E
to E", as more individuals are willing to supply their labor at the going
wage.39 Both the employees' aggregate surplus rose (W"bg>Wcf), and
the employers' aggregate surplus (W"hb>Wic) rise. 0 In this case, the
mandate is indeed efficient but this is only one of many possible
outcomes. In other instances, the magnitude of the shift in the demand
curve (representing the employers' cost of providing the benefit) may be
greater than the magnitude of the shift of the supply curve (representing
the value placed on the benefit by employees), or cd>ab. 4' This indicates
that employees are valuing the benefit at less than its cost. 42 In these
cases, employment levels would fall (E>E"), as well as wages (W>W").
Graphical presentation effectively captures the fact that following
the implementation of a mandate, the relative magnitude of the shift in
the supply and demand curves determines the rate at which employment
and wage rates would change. However, there is another important
factor-the relative elasticity of the supply and demand for labor.
Relative elasticity 43 also determines the wage and employment effects of
36. The supply and demand curves are drawn as straight lines for clarity. Nothing would
change in the analysis if they were drawn as curves.
37. Marginal employees are those employees who are on the margin of participating in the
labor market or withholding their labor at the going wage. Their valuation of the benefit will
determine the wage decrease associated with the mandate.
38. Lee, supra note 28, at 403 n.4. S" parallels S.
39. Id. at 404.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 402-06.
42. Id.
43. Labor supply and demand elasticities are defined as the percentage change in the
employment supplied by employees or demanded by employers, respectively, induced by a 1%
increase in the wage rate. An elasticity value of one for labor supply represents unity. It indicates
that a one percent increase in wages results in a I% increase in labor supplied (employment). Any
value less than one represents an inelastic labor supply, that is, an increase in a 1% in the wage rate
results in less than I% increase in the employment supplied by employees. A value greater than one
indicates the labor supply is elastic, as a 1% increase in wages induces more than a one percent
increase in labor supply. This applies to labor demand elasticity as well, only the value is a negative
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mandated benefits."4 The change in the wage rate, i.e., the percentage of
the mandate's cost that is passed to
5 employees in the form of lower
wages, can be expressed as follows:
-(77d - aqs)
(id - ils)
Where i/d is the elasticity of labor demand, i/s is the elasticity of labor
supply, and a is the fraction of the mandated benefit cost to the
employer which is valued by the employee.46 Valuation by employees
represents the price employees would be willing to pay for the benefit if
the benefit was not mandated and they had to "purchase" the benefit in
the free market. If a equals 1, employees are valuing the benefit at
exactly its cost and would be willing to purchase the benefit at exactly
its cost from their employer. In these cases, employees will absorb the
entire cost through lower wages.47 Wage cuts will offset costs and
employment levels will remain intact.4 8 If employees value the benefit at
more than its cost (a > 1), wages will fall by more than the cost to the
employer and employment levels will increase. 9 Such a result indicates
that the mandate is extremely efficient, and that market failure has
stymied voluntary provision of the benefit)0
If the value of the benefit to employees is less than the cost to the
employer (a < 1), the equation indicates that wages will fall less than
the cost of providing the benefit, and thus employment levels should fall
number. Since the labor demand curve slopes downward, an increase in the wage rate will cause the
demand for labor to decrease.
44. Lee and Craswell unfortunately do not address the impact of labor supply and demand
cross elasticities. Lee, supra note 29; Craswell, supra note 35.
45. Jonathan Gruber & Alan B. Krueger, The Incidence of Mandated Employer-Provided
Insurance: Lessons from Workers' Compensation Insurance, in 5 TAX POLICY AND THE ECONOMY
I11,115 (David Bradford ed., 1991) (introducing the equation).

46.

a =ab
cd
ab and cd are the values from graph I representing employees' value of the benefit and employers'
cost of providing the benefit, respectively.
47. Gruber & Krueger, supra note 45, at 116.
48. Id. at 115.
49. See Graph I supra p. 317.
50. The efficiency argument for mandated benefits must rely on the presence of market
failures. See Summers, supra note 1,at 178-81 (listing several possible market failures that arguably
stymie the voluntary provision of employee benefits, namely information barriers and adverse
selection problems, externality issues, and the fact that some benefits are public goods and would be
underproduced without regulation); Olivia S.Mitchell, The Effects of Mandating Benefits Packages,
I I REs. LAB. ECON. 297, 300-03 (1990) (detailing the various efficiency justifications for
regulatory intervention).
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as well. In the extreme case where employees place no value at all on the
benefit (a = 0), no shift in the supply of labor will take place, and the
incidence of the mandated benefit is exactly analogous to that of a
payroll tax, from which the employees do not benefit at all.5'
In addition to the value attached by employees to the benefit,
employment and wage outcomes are dependent on the magnitude of
labor supply and labor demand elasticities.52 If the demand for labor is
relatively more elastic than the supply for labor,53 meaning that
employers will reduce their demand for labor at a higher rate than
employees are willing to supply it in response to a wage increase, then
even if a is significantly less than 1,cost shifting will occur. In other
words, the more inelastic (steeper) the labor supply curve, the larger the
scale of cost shifting, regardless of employee valuation of the benefit.
This will lead policymakers to believe the mandate is efficient, as no
employment rate changes can be detected.54
Some relevant numerical examples may be useful. Krueger, for
example, offers a 0.1 value for labor supply elasticity and -0.25 value
for labor demand elasticity.5 These values indicate that labor demand is
more elastic than labor supply, as its absolute value is greater. In this
case, 71 % of the benefit costs will be shifted to employees in the form of
lower wages.56 This shift rate is relevant to the cases in which employees
place no value on the benefit (a = 0). If employees value the benefit at
50% of the cost (a = 0.5), wage shifting will account for 85.7% of the
employer's cost57 and employment consequences will hardly be
noticed.58 If we take a less conservative estimate of labor demand

51. Gruber& Krueger, supra note 45, at 116; Summers, supra note 1,at 180-81.
52. Gruber & Krueger, supra note 45, at 116-17.
53. What is at issue is the relative magnitude of the elasticities values, ignoring the sign.
Therefore, if the absolute value of labor demand elasticity is greater than the absolute value of the
labor supply elasticity, labor demand is relatively more elastic than the labor supply. This stands
even if both values are inelastic (absolute values are less than 1).For example, this would occur
when labor demand elasticity equals -0.25 and labor supply elasticity equals 0.1.
54. See generallY Lee, supra note 28; Craswell, supra note 35. Both articles suggest using a
cost shifting magiitude as a rule of thumb to evaluate the efficiency of legal mandates.
55. Krueger, supra note I.
56. This estimation is produced by utilizing the above equation, pertaining to changes in the
wage rate caused by a mandated benefit: -. 25 - 0 = -.714
-. 25-.1
57. -. 25-(.5 x .l)=-.857
-. 25-.1
58. The effect of mandated benefits on employment rates can be formulated as follows:
lL = W0 - W2 - Cx yd
L
WO
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elasticity, for example -0.75,"

9

cost shifting will lhccount for 88.2% of

employer's cost, regardless of employee value (a = 0).
Empirical data supports the claim that the costs incurred by
employers, in providing mandated employee benefits, are shifted to
employees in the form of lower wages, while employment levels are left
relatively unaffected. ° These studies do not clearly differentiate which
factor is responsible for this outcome because it is unclear whether it is
the fact that employees are placing a high value on the benefit or
whether it is the relative inelasticity of labor supply that is responsible
for the outcome. The repetitive pattern of successful cost shifting, across
numerous mandates, suggests that inelasticity of labor supply is a
significant factor because it is highly unlikely that all of the benefits
studied in these surveys were efficient.
These empirical studies strongly suggest that although, in theory,
employment and wage effects of mandated benefits are a function of the
value employees attach to the benefit and the relative elasticities of the
L and dL represent the initial employment level and the employment level after the imposition of
the mandate, respectively. WO and W2 represent the initial wage rate prior to the imposition of the
benefit and the wage rate after the imposition of the benefit, respectively. C represents the
employer's cost of providing the benefit and tid represents labor demand elasticity. This "indicates
that the amount of employment sacrificed because of [the mandate] is inversely related to the wage
offset." Gruber & Krueger, supra note 45, at 115-16.
59. DANIEL S. HAMERMESH, LABOR DEMAND 135 (1993) (using this value as the upper end
of his labor elasticity).
60. Gruber & Krueger, supra note 45, at 112. The authors studied the employment effects of
providing workers' compensation benefits in compliance with state mandates. They found that
changes in employers' cost of providing workers' compensation are largely shifted to employees in
the form of lower wages, with insignificant effects on employment rates. The elasticity of labor
demand resulted in Ujd= -0.5. Id. A 1% increase in workers' compensation costs was associated
with a .011% decline in employment rates. Id. at 139. The effects of the Pregnancy Disability Act
(PDA) are considered in Jonathan Gruber, The Incidence of Mandated Maternity Benefits, 84 AM.
ECON. REV. 622-23 (1994). This mandate requires employers who provide health insurance benefits
to cover pregnancy-related medical benefits in a non-discriminatory manner. Id. at 623. The PDA
raises the costs of employing women of childbearing age and, to some extent, married men in the
same age group. Id. at 625-26. Gruber found that the costs associated with providing pregnancyrelated medical benefits were shifted in the form of lower wages to the demographic groups
enjoying the provision of this mandate, with little effect on employment levels of the affected
groups. Id. at 622. Similarly, Norman K. Thurston, Labor Market Effects of Hawaii's Mandatory
Employer-Provided Health Insurance, 51 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 117, 117-18, 130-31 (1997)
documents the cost shifting of the employer-provided health insurance mandate in Hawaii, with no
employment effects. However, Thurston reports an increase of employment in exempt jobs. Id. at
133. Krueger estimates employment effects of mandating an employer-provided national health
insurance scheme. Krueger, supra note 1. Calculations do not take into account employee valuation
of the benefit (a = 0). Id. Basing calculations only on benefit costs and supply and demand
elasticity, Krueger estimates a 0.2% fall in employment. Id. Using a wider range of supply and
demand elasticities, estimates of the decline in employment range from 200,000-500,000 jobs,
which represent 0.2-0.5% of the American workforce.
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supply and demand for labor, in practice, the bulk of the cost is shifted
in the form of lower wages with no significant employment
consequences. This pattern occurs regardless of employee value of the
benefit, due to the highly inelastic labor supply. Employees
unfortunately bear the cost of the dead weight burden of the mandate,
i.e., the excess cost of the benefit, which they do not value.
But redistribution from employers to employees does not occur.
IV. DISTRIBUTIONAL EFFECTS OF MANDATED BENEFITS:
THE INTRA-EMPLOYEE MATRIX

A. Preface
The redistributive consequences of mandated benefits among
groups of workers, vis-a-vis themselves, has received scant attention .61
The price theory model suggests that where employers cannot shift the
entire cost of the benefit, and thus must decrease employment levels, the
burden of the mandate is passed on to those workers who have to pay
with their job.62 The employees who receive the benefit, i.e., health
insurance or protection against unjust dismissal, are rewarded at the
expense of fellow employees who are laid off or cannot find initial

61. Christine Jolts, Accommodation Mandates,53 STAN. L. REV. 223 (2000-2001), addresses
the intra-employee redistribution effects of accommodation mandates (targeted mandates). Targeted
mandates are mandates that benefit a discrete protected group of employees, such as women or
disabled workers. Id. at 225, 231. Jolls' argument is that whenever targeted mandates are
implemented, employers face an economic incentive to discriminate against the protected group in
either wages (paying them lower wages to offset the cost of providing the targeted benefit) or in
employment levels (lowering the demand for employees triggering the accommodation mandate).
Id. at 246. If non-discrimination mandates are binding and enforced, as is the intention of
accommodation mandates, redistribution will take place in the direction of the accommodated group
of employees at the expense of the non-accommodated group of employees. Id. at 270-71.
Employers, who are prohibited from adjusting wages and/or employment demand for targeted group
members, must spread the labor cost associated with the mandate across their entire workforce. Id.
at 248. This results in redistribution because all workers are financing the cost of the targeted
benefit, while only the accommodated group of employees is benefiting. Id. at 246. Jolls does not
discuss the redistribution effects of universal mandates, which are directed to all or virtually all
employees. See John J. Donohue Il1,
Understanding the Reasons for and Impact of Legislatively
Mandated Benefits for Selected Workers, 53 STAN. L. REV. 897 (2001) (discussing Jolts' framework
and applying it to other antidiscrimination mandates, such as sexual harassment and disparate
impact law). Donohue correctly points out that Jolls relies on a partial equilibrium model and does
not address the possibility that labor markets do not follow the simple price theory model, but are
rather more complex. Id. at 909-12.
62. Jolls, supra note 61, at 246.
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employment.63 As explained, when there are no wage adjustment
constraints, as in the case of minimum wage standards, wages will adjust
but employment levels generally will not be affected. Where, then, are
the intra-employee redistribution effects?
Today it is well accepted that labor markets operate within dual
channels.' There is a primary internal labor market in which wages and
benefits tend to be higher than in the secondary market. It is also argued
that in the internal labor market, employers do not respond immediately
to changes in the supply of labor by depressing the compensation
package. 6' The secondary or external market is assumed, by contrast, to
be operating according to the price theory model. Therefore, fluctuation
in the supply and demand for workers is likely to disproportionately
affect wages and employment levels of the workers employed in the
external market.
The main argument in this section is that mandated benefits often
involuntarily promote dual market practices. Mandated benefits policies
shift covered employment relationships into the internal labor market, as
they impose fixed labor costs on employers. Some of these costs, such as
firing costs, are one-time costs, which encourage employers to depress
turnover rates. This may seem a welcome outcome since internal
employment settings typically are beneficial to workers. However,
because mandates cannot effectively eliminate the external labor market,
mandates may well be redistributing wealth from external labor market
employees to internal labor market employees. Employers are passing
some of the costs associated with mandates to uncovered employees by
depressing their wages to finance the costs of the mandates. Employers
are able to engage in exempt sector cost shifting due to labor supply
inelasticity. This effectively means that employers can choose which
group of employees will carry the costs of the mandates. Employers may
find it beneficial that exempt sector employees will carry some of the
costs. They may believe that differentiating between internal and
external market employees raises the commitment and productivity of
internal market employees as their relative compensation package
increases.

63. See Steven L. Willborn, Individual Employment Rights and the Standard Economic
Objection: Theory and Empiricism, 67 NEB. L. REV. 101, 109-15 (1988), for a discussion of this
line of argument.
64. See RONALD G. EHRENBERG & ROBERT S. SMITH, MODERN LABOR ECONOMICS:
THEORY AND PUBLIC POLICY, 396-412 (7th ed.. 2000).
65. Id.
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The avowed purpose of most mandated benefits programs is not to
enforce employment within the primary labor market. Each mandate has
its own discrete purpose, whether it is eradicating discrimination,
providing job security, unpaid leave or health insurance. However, the
mandate often has the effect of entrenching dual market practices.
B. Dual Market Theory
Dual labor market models can roughly be divided into two main
categories, the efficiency wage model and the lifetime or career
employment model. The efficiency wage model is based on the
observation that firms usually do not find it profitable to cut wages in the
face of involuntary unemployment, resulting in downward wage
rigidities.66 The model's main objective is to offer a convincing
explanation for the existence of involuntary unemployment.
Involuntary unemployment is antithetical to the price theory description
of the labor market because when unemployment occurs supply and
demand do not clear. Price theory proponents must argue, then, that what
is assumed to be involuntary unemployment is actually voluntary
unemployment. The efficiency wage model suggests, however, that
involuntary unemployment is due to the fact that employers find it
profitable to pay above-equilibrium wages, and therefore wages will not
clear. If labor productivity depends on the wage paid by the firm, that is
productivity increases with pay, then decreasing wages will decrease
productivity. For this reason, employers are reluctant to cut wages and
downward wage rigidities are common.
The various efficiency models differ in their account of this
phenomenon, that is in their explanation of why productivity increases
with higher wages. The shirking model criticizes the price theory
framework for assuming that all workers devote the same amount of
effort at the workplace and that this amount is not subject to choice by
either the worker or his employer.68 In real life, employers have come to
learn that productivity rises with higher wages, i.e., that you can extract
greater effort by paying higher wages. In this model, involuntary

66. See George A. Akerlof & Janet L. Yellen, Introduction to

EFFICIENCY WAGE MODELS OF

THE LABOR MARKET 1, 2 (George A. Akerlof & Janet L. Yellen ed., 1986), for a review of the

various efficiency wage models.
67. Id. at 1-2.
68. See, e.g., Carl Shapiro & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker
Disciplined Device, in EFFICIENCY WAGE MODELS OF THE LABOR MARKET 45, 45-48 (George A.
Akerlof & Janet L. Yellen eds., 1986).
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structural unemployment serves as a disciplining mechanism for internal
labor market employees: workers will produce the greater effort
expected of them for fear that if they are caught shirking, they will find
themselves relegated to inferior jobs in the external labor market.
Another efficiency wage model, the turnover model, emphasizes
information barriers from a different angle. It is concerned with the
ability of employers to evaluate prospective employees. 69 By offering
above-equilibrium wages, the firm can attract a better pool of
candidates. 0 This model suggests that by paying above-equilibrium
wages, employers can depress worker turnover rates. 7' If an employer is
paying above market wages, it reduces the likelihood that employees
will voluntarily exit. If an organization is encountering high recruiting
and training costs, paying efficiency wages will lengthen retention rates.
The price theory model, by contrast, assumes that one can always find a
job at the external market wage.72
Lastly, there is the sociological model, which explains wage
rigidity as an outcome of social conventions and principles of
appropriate behavior.73 The employer can succeed in raising group work
norms and average effort by paying workers a gift of wages in excess of
the minimum required in return for a gift of effort above the minimum
required.
The second major theory attempting to explain the phenomenon of
dual labor markets could be labeled the lifetime or career employment
model.74 This model is not concerned with involuntary unemployment;
rather, it seems to address the issue that some employees enjoy a stable,
long-term employment relationship with internal promotion ladders.75
Employment relationships with a single employer may last throughout
an individual's entire working career. Lifetime employees are identified
usually by an up sloping wage curve which is correlated with seniority
within the firm and explicit or implied promises of job security. 76

69.

See, e.g., Andrew Weiss, Job Queues and Layoffs in Labor Markets with Flexible Wages,

in EFFICIENCY

WAGE MODELS OF THE LABOR MARKET

102 (George A. Akerlof & Janet L. Yellen

eds., 1986).
70. Id. at 103. The turnover model is based on the adverse selection theory.
71. See, e.g., Steven C. Salop, A Model of the Natural Rate of Unemployment, in EFFICIENCY
WAGE MODELS OF THE LABOR MARKET 93 (George A. Akerlof & Janet L. Yellen eds., 1986).
72. Id.
73. See, e.g., George A. Akerlof, Labor Contracts As Partial Gift Exchange, in EFFICIENCY
WAGE MODELS OF THE LABOR MARKET 66 (George A. Akerlof & Janet L. Yellen eds., 1986).
74. See generally EHRENBERG & SMITH, supra note 64, at 400-08.
75. See id.
76. See id.
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These employees usually enjoy extended benefits, which in some cases
are accumulated with seniority." On the other hand, other employees do
not fare as well in the labor market; their jobs do not carry any
meaningful job security, they are provided with fewer benefits and they
may hold many different jobs in the course of their working life.
From an efficiency perspective, it is argued that the lifetime
employment scheme will be adopted in organizations that rely heavily
on firm-specific human capital." When employers need their workers to
acquire firm-specific skills, which have little or no value in external
labor markets,7 9 an opportunity for strategic behavior on both sides
arises.5s The employer is vulnerable to the ability of his employees to
leave after the employer has invested in costly training.8' Meanwhile,
workers possessing specific skills are susceptible to opportunistic
behavior by their employer82 because their opportunity wages are lower
compared to similar workers, who have acquired general skills. 83 In order
to deter both sides from acting strategically, the parties implicitly agree
to a form of lifetime employment during which wages diverge from the
employee's marginal product." This employment arrangement serves as
a self-enforcement contract mechanism. Employees are deterred from
exiting because some of their compensation is deferred, whether by
seniority-based wage and benefit ladders or by vesting periods.
Employers are deterred from laying off workers by the explicit or
implicit promises of job security, supplemented by reputation concerns."'
77. Initial treatment was descriptive. It was sometimes assumed that lifetime employment
practices were motivated by the desire to curtail the importance of economic forces, as in the case of
unionized establishments. See Clark Kerr, The Balkanization of Labor Markets, in LABOR
MOBILITY AND ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY 92, 97-99 (1954). For a discussion of the evolution of the
lifetime employment theory, see Gillian Lester, Careers and Contingency, 51 STAN. L. REV. 73,
105-10 (1998-1999) (viewing the model according to the segmentationist school of thought).
78. See GARY S. BECKER, HUMAN CAPITAL: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS,
WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO EDUCATION 26-37 (2d ed. 1975).
79. Id. at 26. However, the value of general skills does not depreciate in the external market.
Id. at 19.
80. See Wachter & Wright, supra note 4, at 243-44.
81. See id. at 243-44.
82. See id. at 244, 260.
83. See id. at 244-45.
84. Id. at 244. The model assumes that total compensation will equal the worker's lifetime
marginal product, but it relaxes the price theory requirement of simultaneousness.
85. See Edward P. Lazear, Why Is There Mandatory Retirement?, 87 J. POL. ECON. 1261,
1261 (1979). Prior to the outlawing of mandatory retirement by the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA), many lifetime employment relationships were based on mandatory
retirement. Mandatory retirement was the end point of the relational contract. At retirement, the
present value of the stream of wages and other compensation components should equalize the
present value of the compounded productivity of the employee during the career-long work period,
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Efficiency wage and lifetime employment models overlap to some
extent.s6 In the literature they are not well distinguished from one
another. This may be because both theories attempt to offer a coherent
explanation of the presence of dual labor markets, in which the internal
labor market does not seem to follow the textbook economic model of
supply and demand." Nonetheless, it is important to distinguish between
the two models. Efficiency wage models are primarily concerned with
the existence of involuntary unemployment. In contrast, the career-based
employment model is concerned with curtailing strategic behavior
within the labor market and developing self-enforcing mechanisms for
employment contracts. Moreover, the job security clause, whether
explicit or implicit, is critical in the career-based employment model but
is fatal within the efficiency wage shirking model. The shirking model
assumes that employers can respond immediately and costlessly by
firing shirking employees. Any form of job security, be it explicit,
implicit or merely procedural, burdens the employer and alters the rules
of the game. Employees will not increase effort if they estimate
employers firing costs as significant.
According to these distinctions, Silicon Valley's high velocity labor
market can be categorized as an external labor market pursuant to the
career-based employment model. The workers' retention rates are short
and there are no commitments on behalf of employers or employees for
an ongoing long-term relationship." In contrast, within the efficiency
wage model, these workers can be categorized as internal market
employees. The employees are sufficiently compensated and their
compensation packages, which include shares and option plans, operate
as an efficiency wage tool to increase effort and productivity.

thus leaving intact the underlying assumption of the price theory that wages cannot exceed the
marginal productivity of the worker.
86. Paying efficiency wages deters voluntary turnover on behalf of employees. This may
cause retention rates to rise, even if employees do not enjoy explicit or implicit job security.
Employers can now invest in training their workforce. Similarly, the fact that higher wages raise
productivity assures workers, according to the efficiency wage model, that their employer will not
depress wages in the face of an increased supply of labor. This again resembles the pattern of
employment according to the lifetime employment model, in which the wage graph is determined
internally within the establishment. One can also describe the lifetime employment model in terms
of paying efficiency wages. The up sloping wage curve and job security granted to employees are
raising productivity not only due to human capital accumulation but also due to increased efforts by
employees, or in terms of the sociological gift exchange model, with a "present" of increased effort.
87. Wachter & Wright, supra note 4 (providing an example of an amalgam of both theories).
88. See Alan Hyde, Silicon Valley's High-Velocity Labor Market, II J. APPLIED CORP. FIN.
28 (1998); see also ANNALEE SAXENIAN, REGIONAL ADVANTAGE: CULTURE AND COMPETITION IN
SILICON VALLEY AND ROUTE 128, 132-59 (1994).
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C. The Demandfor Labor
To understand how mandated employee benefits redistribute wealth
and alter the employment setting, it is imperative to gain a better grasp
of the nature and the variety of labor costs. The mix of these labor costs
will govern the route of labor into or out of internal markets.
In his book, Daniel Hamermesh lays out a typology of labor costs. s9
The initial distinction is between fixed costs which vary only with
employment level and variable costs which vary with hours worked or
the wage itself90 A fixed-cost mandate requires employers to provide the
same benefit package irrespective of the hours worked or the wage
earned. 9' Fixed cost benefits increase low wage earners' overall
compensation relatively more than that of highly paid employees, which
induces employers to substitute high-skilled labor for low-skilled labor. 92
In addition, employers affected by the fixed cost mandate will tend to
utilize more hours per worker. 93 Within the category of fixed costs, there
are recurring costs such as health coverage, which generate the same
premium every time period. 94 The other subcategory of fixed costs are
one-time costs, which are incurred only when a triggering event occurs. 95
One-time fixed costs are usually associated with workers' mobility.96
They include hiring costs (training costs and antidiscrimination
mandates) and firing costs (severance pay, antidiscrimination mandates,
job security mandates and WARN rights).97 These mandates also curtail
mobility rates because these costs are incurred only when entrance into
or exit from the employment relationship takes place. One-time fixed
89.

HAMERMESH, supra note 59, at 46-55.

Id. at 46.
Daniel S. Hamermesh, The Demand for Workers and Hours and the Effects of Job
Security Policies: Theory and Evidence, in EMPLOYMENT, UNEMPLOYMENT AND LABOR
UTILIZATION 9, 10 (Robert A. Hard ed., 1988).
92. Id. at I1. Take, for example, health insurance benefits. Presently, employer-provided
health insurance is mandated only in Hawaii. In other states, many employers offer voluntary health
insurance coverage as part of their compensation package. Health insurance is a fixed labor cost.
Providing a certain package of health benefits costs employers exactly the same whether an
employee works part-time or full-time, or whether an employee is earning minimum wage or an
hourly wage well in excess of the minimum. It is therefore apparent that as a percentage of total
compensation, the share of health benefits increases as the wage rate decreases.
93. Id. at 10.
90.
91.

94.

HAMERMESH, supra note 59, at 47-48.

95.

id.

96.

Jack E. Triplett, Introduction to THE MEASUREMENT OF LABOR COST I, 19-21 (Jack E.

Triplett ed., 1983): HAMERMESH, supra note 59, at 207.
97. See HAMERMESH, supra note 59, at 48; Hamermesh, supra note 91, at 12; Triplett, supra
note 96, at 19.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol20/iss2/3

18

Rabin-Margalioth: Cross-Employee Redistribution Effects of Mandated Employee Benefi
2003]

Cross-Employee Redistribution Effects

cost mandates enforce career based, long-term employment work
arrangements.
The distinctions among variable costs are harder to articulate.98
All variable labor -costs are prorated to the wage rate. One can
differentiate among the regular hourly wages (reflected in minimum
wage mandates), overtime wage costs99 and non-wage variable costs
(such as premiums for social security, unemployment and workers'
compensation benefits, which are computed based on the employee
wage rates).' °° Next we will investigate how the different types of labor
costs, i.e., types of mandates, affect the employment setting.
1. Fixed Recurring Cost Mandates
A simple function of labor output assumes that twenty employees
working a forty-hour work week is equivalent to ten workers working an
eighty-hour work week, and in both cases labor input is eight hundred
hours per week. No account is taken here of differences in the prices and
productivity of these two means of altering the input of labor.' '
In reality, employers face many choices about how many employees to
employ and how many hours they will work,' 2 even if employment
output, i.e., total amount of hours worked by all employees is held
constant. 0 3 Because mandated benefits are part of the compensation
package, i.e., labor costs, we should inquire how mandates affect
employers' decisions on substitution between hours and employment
levels.
Fixed cost mandates are sensitive to the size of the workforce rather
than to wages. All other factors being equal, this feature encourages
employers to employ fewer workers and have them work more hours.
98. See HAMERMESH, supra note 59, at 48.
99. Both regular and overtime wage costs are mandated by the FLSA.
100. See HAMERMESH, supra note 59, at 48. Some non-wage variable costs are transformed
into fixed costs whenever the mandate has a cap. When this occurs an employer who employs
workers who reached the cap will treat these costs as fixed. This is because the employer owes
nothing beyond the cap. For example, the employer might work these workers longer hours and
hiring fewer employees in order to save on the mandates' costs pertaining the new hires. The
variable cost in these cases "transforms" beyond the cap into a fixed cost. This is relevant to Social
Security payments, which are capped.
101. See id. at 45. Hamermesh gives the following intuitive example: doubling weekly hours
from 60 to 120 per worker will probably not double the amount of effective labor, as there is a limit
on an employee's ability to work effectively beyond a certain amount of hours. Id.
102. Id. at 45-46 ("Hours H are measured per time period ... The convention is to measure H
as hours per week .....
103. Id. at 45.
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To minimize the labor costs of producing at any level of output, an
employer should adjust his employment levels and work week so that
the cost of producing an additional unit of output is equal between those
two means of adjustment."
MEm MEh
MPm MPh
MEm denotes the marginal costs of hiring another employee.'05 This
marginal expense is a function of hourly wages, fixed labor costs and
variable employee benefit costs. '°6 MEh represents the marginal costs of
working incumbent employees for an additional hour.' 7 This marginal
expense will equal hourly wages, variable employee benefit costs and
overtime pay, if applicable, multiplied by the number of employees
working the additional hour.' °" MPm and MPh represent the marginal
productivity of hiring an additional employee and working incumbent
employees for an additional hour, respectively."'" If MEm rises relatively
to MEh, a profit-maximizing employer will want to substitute hours for
workers, hiring fewer workers but having each work more hours." °
Many mandated benefits are of a fixed cost nature and thus increase
MEm relative to MEh when implemented. Empirical studies indicate that
average weekly overtime has been steadily increasing."' This may be
principally due to the increase in fixed labor costs.
Employer-provided health insurance coverage is a good example of
how fixed recurring labor costs drive employers to substitute hours for

104. EHRENBERG & SMITH, supra note 64, at 149-50.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. EHRENBERG & SMITH, supra note 64, at 149-50.
110. Id.
111. Ron L. Hetrick, Analyzing the Recent Upward Surge in Overtime Hours, 123 MONTHLY
LAB. REV. 30 (2000). Between March 1991 and early 1997, average manufacturing overtime
increased by 1.6 hours, reaching the highest level of 4.9 hours since the Bureau of Labor Statistics
began publishing the Current Employment Statistics Survey in 1956. Id. at 30. Overtime is defined
as "hours for which premiums were paid because they exceeded the number of straight-time
workday or workweek hours." Id. "Average overtime is computed by dividing the total number of
overtime hours in a given industry by the number of production workers in that industry, including
those that work no overtime at all." Id. The author computed the full-time equivalent of the
overtime increase. Id. at 32. This tells us how many full-time jobs could have substituted for the
increase in overtime. From March 1991 to January 1998, the full-time aggregate overtime hours in
manufacturing was equivalent to 571,000 jobs. Id. At the same time, production jobs in the
manufacturing industry increased by 601,000 jobs. Id. This means that if employers had substituted
overtime hours for new hires, nearly twice as many production jobs would have been created. Id.
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employment levels. Not yet required outside Hawaii, ' 2 health insurance
provisions are encouraged by favorable tax treatment." 3 Health insurance
is a fixed recurring cost. Once an employer is providing health insurance
coverage, cost does not vary with hours worked or wages. Employers
incur premium costs on a recurring basis, monthly or yearly.
A study of the labor markets' response to rising fixed costs suggests
that rising health insurance costs during the 1980s increased the hours
worked by those with health insurance by up to 3%." ' The study argues
that this occurred because health insurance is a fixed cost, and as health
insurance became more expensive to provide, firms faced an incentive to
substitute hours for employment."' This means that even when
employers can offset the entire cost of providing the benefit by lowering
incumbent workers' wages, 6 they will choose to increase incumbent
employees' hours, which will decrease the cost per hour of providing the
benefit."'
The experience of Hawaii's mandatory employer-provided health
insurance program offers an example of how fixed cost mandates shift
labor demand for uncovered employees." 8 Thurston found that the
112. Thurston, supra note 60, at 118.
113. Id. at 120.
114. David M. Cutler & Brigitte C. Madrian, Labor Market Responses to Rising Health
Insurance Costs: Evidence on Hours Worked, 29 RAND J. EcON. 509, 510 (1998). The authors
concentrate on health insurance because "half of the increase in nonwage compensation costs from
1980 to 1990 is accounted for by increased expenditures on health insurance." Id.
115. Id. at 509.
116. Id. at 509, 527. Because health insurance outside Hawaii is voluntarily provided, perfect
cost shifting must be assumed. Employer-employee matches that do not find the cost of health
insurance to be outweighed by its value to employees will decline to provide the benefit altogether.
Id. at 509. The Cutler and Madrian study shows that even in a voluntary setting, fixed costs benefits
are not neutral pertaining to the choice between hours and employment levels. Cutler & Madrian,
supra note 114, at 527. It is still more efficient to increase hours while letting other employees
crowd the uninsured labor market. Id.
117. A similar point is advanced in a 1989 survey of childcare centers, which examines the
effects of voluntary fringe benefits on -the demand of covered part-time teachers and teacher aides.
Mark Montgomery & James Cosgrove, The Effect of Employee Benefits on the Demand for PartTime Workers, 47 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 87, 87, 93-94, 96 (1993). As the level of fringe benefit
payments rose, hours of work by eligible part-time workers fell significantly relative to the hours
worked by full-time teachers and aides. Id. at 87. An increase in benefit of 1% of the wage bill
decreased the proportion of part-time hours by 0.43 percentage points for teachers and by 0.35
percentage points for teacher aides. Id. at 94-95. Particularly influential were insurance payments
such as health care and dental care, which are fixed recurring costs, as opposed to prorated variable
benefits such as pensions and paid vacation. The effect detected was more than twice as large. Id. at
96. This indicates that in response to universal fixed cost mandates (which cannot exclude part-time
employees or other subgroup of workers), employers will not respond by decreasing the wages of
all incumbent employees. Instead, they will reduce employment rates of part-time employees.
118. Thurston, supra note 60, at 117, 130.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2003

21

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 20, Iss. 2 [2003], Art. 3
Hofstra Libor & Employment Law Journal

[Vol. 20:311

percentage of Hawaiian workers employed less than twenty hours per
week, thus exempt from coverage under the statute, increased." 9
This result is in accordance with a price theory model in which
minimum wage mandates initiate increased demand for labor in the
uncovered sectors.'20 In the Thurston study, the detected shift into the
uncovered sector is explained by the fact that employers do not have to
provide insurance for these workers.'2 '
Two insights pertaining to fixed recurring mandates are suggested.
The first is when employers encounter an increase in fixed cost2
mandates they will increase overtime and restrict new hiring.1
The second point is that demand for exempt employment relationships
will also increase as fixed cost mandates increase.' 23 These practices
parallel dual labor market models: employees who are covered by the
mandate are working more hours and are probably being paid overtime
premiums for these extra hours, while other employees are crowded into
exempt jobs. 2 4 As discussed below, there is no empirical data supporting
the frequently offered claim that uncovered employees are paid
compensating wages to offset the fact that the benefit program does not
cover them."'
2. One-Time Fixed Cost Mandates
Some fixed labor costs can be defined as one-time costs.'26 They are
incurred only once during the tenure of a specific worker and are linked
to the quit rate in the workplace.'2 7 The higher the one-time costs, the
greater the employer's incentive to reduce turnover rates and to increase
119. Id. at 130, 133. "For a 10 percentage point increase in the fraction of employees in an
industry who receive health insurance, about 1% more jobs were shifted into the exempt, low-hours
sector in Hawaii than in the United States as a whole." Id. at 130.
120. The two-sector model is introduced in Jacob Mincer, Unemployment Effects of Mininium
Wages, 84 J. POL. ECON. S87 (1976).
121. Thurston, supra note 60, at 131. See generally Rebecca M. Blank, Contingent Work in a
Changing Labor Market, in GENERATING JOBS: HOW TO INCREASE DEMAND FOR LESS-SKILLED
WORKERS 258 (Richard B. Freeman & Peter Gottschalk eds., 1998) (reviewing studies that report
demand shifts to uncovered work arrangements when voluntary benefit programs are implemented).
122. Cutler & Madrian, supra note 114, at 527.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. See infra Part IV.D; see also Cutler & Madrian, supra note 114, at 527. The Cutler &
Madrian study indicates that hourly wages were higher for employees with health insurance than for
those without it. Id. But this study, which uses inter-establishment data, cannot control well for
disparate employees' characteristics and establishment working conditions. Id. at 516.
126. HAMERMASH, supra note 59, at 47-48.
127. Id. at 48.
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the hours per employee ratio in order to avoid the incidence of the fixed
cost mandate.'28 Such mandates serve as an enforcement mechanism for
internal markets in the career-based employment model.
One-time fixed'costs mandates, such as just cause dismissal rules,
obviously promote internal markets and the same can be said of
antidiscrimination mandates. If employers are vulnerable to litigation by
protected group members at the hiring and firing stages, they will limit
mobility by hiring fewer workers and by avoiding discharge of
incumbent employees.'2 9 Voluntary adoption of career employment
practices is motivated by the costs incurred by the mobility of labor,
which can be extensive. Commonly mentioned costs include recruitment
and loss of specific human capital, but other mobility costs, such as
threat of expensive litigation or mandatory severance pay schemes, will
also operate to encourage the adoption of internal labor market
structures.
The impact of exit mandates is greater than entrance mandates for
the simple reason that there are many more mandates which increase
firing costs than mandates which increase hiring costs. 130 This is not

surprising because the goal of most dynamic labor market policies is to
increase employment and cushion layoffs. It is hard to find policies that
deliberately seek to increase hiring costs. 3 ' On the other hand, many

mandates are aimed at raising firing costs. Most notable are the common
law exceptions to the employment at will doctrine, severance pay
schemes, plant closing notification statutes and the antidiscrimination
32
statutes, which are enforced primarily in the dismissal context.

128. Id. at 49.
129. It is fairly obvious that a policy that effectively taxes hiring reduces it and therefore, leads
to employment being held constant longer during an upturn in product demand. It also produces a
reduction in firing rates which can be understood by noting that any fired worker must eventually be
replaced in a future boom. Mandates that add costs to firing decisions operate in a similar manner.
It taxes layoffs, but also hiring, as encumbered employees may have to be fired in the future.
130. John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment
DiscriminationLitigation,43 STAN. L. REV. 983, 1027 (1990-1991).
131. The relevant groups of mandates that indirectly raise hiring costs are the various
employment antidiscrimination statutes. Id.
132. Id. The authors find that "firing cases are six times more likely than hiring cases" and that
"the likelihood of suit when an employer fires a protected applicant is thirty times greater than the
likelihood of suit if the employer simply fails to hire the worker." Id. The authors also note that the
"dramatic shift to firing cases has greatly increased the likelihood that Title VII will create a drag on
the hiring of protected workers rather than the positive inducement it originally provided." Id. The
authors then conclude that
the effects of Title VII have changed from the opening up of access to jobs for traditional
victims of discrimination to the protection of those who already have jobs. We may now
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Perhaps the best current example of a one-time fixed cost mandate
is the common law exception to the employment at will doctrine, which
is now recognized in most states. 33 The three doctrines at play are the
implied contract exception,' the public policy exception' 35 and the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing exception.'36 The impact of these
judicial mandates on employment and wage rates is the focus of three
recent empirical studies.
Autor, Donohue III and Schwab found that only the implied
contract exception appears to have affected employment rates.37
Negative employment effects were not detected following the adoption
of the tort-based public policy exception and/or the good faith dealing
exception.138 Little evidence of the impact of the common law exceptions
have a sort of implicit tort of wrongful discharge ... for virtually all workers except
white males under age 40.
Donohue III & Siegelman, supra note 130, at 1033. See Ian Ayres & Peter Siegelman, The Q-Word
as Red Herring: Why DisparateImpact Liability Does Not Induce Hiring Quotas, 74 TEX. L. REV.
1487, 1490 (1996) (noting that since 1993, only one out of four disparate impact decisions in federal
courts involves claims of discrimination in hiring).
133. Charles J. Muhl, The Etnployment-At-Will Doctrine: Three Major Exceptions, 124
MONTHLY LAB. REV. 3, 4, 7, 10 (2001) (noting that as of October 1, 2000, forty-three states
recognized the public policy exception, thirty-eight states recognized the implied contract exception,
and eleven states recognized the covenant of good faith and fair dealing exception).
134. Id. at 7-10. The implied contract exception to "the employment-at-will doctrine is applied
when an implied contract is formed between an employer and employee, even though no express,
written" contract pertaining to job security exists. Id. at 7. An employer can present oral, written or
other behavioral representations to employees pertaining to "job security or procedures that will be
followed when adverse employment actions are taken." Id. The courts may find these
representations as contractually binding. Id.
135. Muhl, supra note 133, at 4-7.
Under the public policy exception to employment at will, an employee is wrongfully
discharged when the termination is against an explicit, well-established public policy of
the State. For example, in most States, an employer cannot terminate an employee for
filing a workers' compensation claim after being injured on the job, or for refusing to
break the law at the request of the employer. The majority view among States is that
public policy may be found in either a State constitution, statute or administrative
rule.... The majority view is not based on a vaguer sense of public policy.
Id. at 4.
136. Id. at 10-11. Recognized by only eleven states, this exception "reads a covenant of good
faith and fair dealing into every employment relationship." Id. at 10. It has been interpreted to mean
that an employer is in breach of her covenant when terminating an employee to prevent the
employee from enjoying the benefits of her employment. Id.
137. David H. Autor, John J. Donohue III & Stewart J. Schwab, The Costs of Wrongful
Discharge Laws 3 tbl.I (Oct. 2, 2001) (paper presented at the New York University Labor and
Employment Law Center Workshop). The adoption of the exception was followed by a decline of
0.41 to 0.62 percentage points in the ratio of employment to population. Id.
138. Id. at 3. One possible explanation to these findings is that the public policy and good faith
dealing exceptions do not have a bite they do not burden employers with additional costs. They
legally exist, but employers do not find them monetarily meaningful, as they are rarely enforced
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on hourly wage was traced. 39 These findings parallel our explanatory
discussions of the nature of one-time fixed costs. The implied contract
mandate had a greater impact on low-waged, young, uneducated
employees than on educated, older employees.' 40 As previously.
discussed, fixed cost benefits increase low-wage employee
compensation relative to highly paid employees. This encourages
employers to substitute high skilled employees 4for low skilled
employees as their relative employment costs decrease.' '
The Miles study 4 2 reports that the common law exceptions did not43
affect employment or unemployment rates in the United States.'
However, following the adoption of the implicit contract exception,
temporary help supply (THS) employment was observed to increase by
15%.'" Autor investigates the relationship between the common law45
exceptions and the growth of the temporary help industry.'
He estimates that 20% of the growth of THS employment between

against them. Another explanation is that when these two exceptions are enforced, it is in a manner
that is not regulating the employment contract, but rather interpreting and enforcing the authentic
mutual understanding of the parties. Therefore, these exceptions do not translate into additional
labor costs. Employers do not view them as external interventions with their dismissal prerogative.
139. Id. at 30 tbl. 16. The authors concede that the price theory would predict a dampening
effect on wages as employers shift the cost of the mandate over to their employees, but no such
effect was traced. Autor, Donohue III & Schwab, supra note 137, at 30.
140. Id. at tbl.4. The highest impact was found in relation to the group consisting of loweducated, young males (1.9%) and a 1.1% impact in relation to the employment of younger, less
educated females. No impact was detected pertaining to the elder, better educated portion of the
workforce. Autor, Donohue III & Schwab, supra note 137.
141. It should be noted that other explanations could be attached to these findings. It could be
argued that the elder, more educated portion of the workforce enjoys, on average, more voluntary
job security protection. The judicial mandate did not confer costs pertaining to this segment of the
workforce and therefore, its employment rates remained unaffected. The segment of the labor
market, which was regulated, i.e., those employees who did not previously enjoy job security the
young and uneducated labor market participants were the ones encountering the employment
consequences of the mandate. Summers, supra note I, at 180, advances the same point. When
assessing the impact of mandates we have to differentiate between employers whose prior voluntary
policies were in compliance with the new standard (those employers and their employees are not
affected by the mandate) and those employers who now must adhere to the new standard and face
the consequences of additional labor costs.
142. Thomas J. Miles, Common Law Exceptions to Employment at Will and U.S. Labor
Markets, 16 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 74 (2000).
143. Autor, Donohue IIl & Schwab, supra note 137, attempt to reconcile the differences.
144. Miles, supra note 143, at 74 (suggesting, as well, that the other two exceptions are
monetarily meaningless).
145. DAVID H. AUTOR, OUTSOURCING AT WILL: UNJUST DISMISSAL DOCTRINE AND THE
GROWTH OF TEMPORARY HELP EMPLOYMENT (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.

7557, 2000) (reporting that temporary help industry employment has grown five times more rapidly
than overall employment).
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1973-1995
can be attributed to the recognition of the implicit contract
46
doctrine.
The detected growth in the temporary help industry resulting from
the adoption of the implied contract exception fits well within the dual
market theory. Job security, representing a one-time exit fixed cost,
interferes with labor market mobility as it encourages employers to
retain incumbent permanent employees in a career employment setting.
Firms have an incentive, however, to structure all other employment
relationships outside the reach of the mandate, i.e., in the exempt sector.
In the context of the employment at will exceptions, this means
employers will tend to hire temporary help employees, who are less
likely to trigger judicial interference. Courts are generally unwilling to
extend the protection of the common law at will exceptions to contingent
workers, including employees of temporary help agencies.17 Both
studies support the argument that end users of temporary help agency
workers increase their demand for temporary workers precisely because
they view these employees as exempt from the implicit contract
exception. 4 8 The labor market impact of the mandate is that covered
employees (protected by the job security mandate) are now part of the
internal career-based employment setting, while the transition to THS
employment arrangements represents the low-end external exempt
sector.149
D. The Redistribution Effects of Fixed Cost MandatedBenefits
The fact that an increase in the demand for exempt employees often
follows the implementation of a mandated benefit program does not yet
prove that regressive intra-employee redistribution occurs. To the
contrary, the price theory model suggests that wage differentials will
compensate exempt employees for the lack of mandated benefits.150

146. Id. at 2. Halfa million workers found themselves employed within the THS industry due
to the recognition of the implicit contract exception. Id.
147. See, e.g., Mark Berger, Unjust Dismissal and the Contingent Worker: Restructuring
Doctrine for the Restructured Worker, 16 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. I, 8, 28-35 (1997) (detailing the
extensive case law that declined to extend the protection of the common law at will exceptions to
contingent workers, including employees of temporary help agencies).
148. Id. at 5-6 (discussing employers' willingness to hire from leasing agencies because there
are no long-term employment expectations).
149. See id. at 6-7.
150. Under this model, markets always reach equilibrium, and total compensation for
comparable employees must be equivalent as well.
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Attempts to verify this theory, however, prove opposite results.
Studies in the 1980s involving non-mandatory benefit policies found that
compensating wage differentials were not associated with the presence
of pension benefits and paid holiday' 5 ' or sick leave and health insurance
benefits." 2 These studies deal with voluntarily provided benefit plans
and were not completely successful in controlling for all relevant
employer and employee characteristics.
More recent studies have been able to control for working
conditions and employee characteristics by using intra-establishment
comparisons. 4 But these studies did not find compensating wage
differentials to offset non-coverage of the benefit plan.'55 Rather, they
suggest that workers can be paid similar wages even though some are
denied coverage of voluntary benefit plans."'5 6
Lettau's study comparing compensation of part-time and full-time
employees within the same establishment,'5 ' reports that hourly wages,
hourly benefit costs and total compensation per hour were substantially
lower for part-time jobs than for full-time jobs, even for workers who

15 1. See Robert S. Smith & Ronald G. Ehrenberg, Estimating Wage-Fringe Trade-Offs: Some
Data Problems, in THE MEASUREMENT OF LABOR COST 347, 347 (Jack E. Triplett ed., 1983). Using
employer-based data on employee compensation packages, Smith and Ehrenberg were unable to
trace the predicated tradeoff between wages and fringe benefits. Id. at 364. One explanation to this
finding was that maybe the "theory is wrong, or at least not predictive of 'real world' behavior." Id.
152. See, e.g., Arleen Leibowitz, Fringe Benefits in Employee Compensation, in THE
MEASUREMENT OF LABOR COST 371 (Jack E. Triplett ed., 1983). In this study, hedonic wage
equations showed that for employees receiving benefits from their employer, the level of benefits
was positively related to wages (contrary to the compensating wage deferential theory). Id. at 386.
Men did not seem to pay any significant price in terms of lost earnings for receiving sick leave. Id.
Accident insurance benefits also did not affect wage rates, and for life insurance and health care
coverage, the amount of employer paid premiums was positively related to wages, i.e., the more
generous the plan was the wage rate was higher. Id. The price theory model must explain these
findings in terms of uncontrolled differences in the human capital of workers or other job traits.
Dual market theory can offer efficiency enhancing justifications for these findings.
153. See id. at 371-72. Failure to control for all establishment/worker characteristics cannot
eliminate the possibility that we are not comparing two identical jobs. Ehrenberg and Smith suggest
that failure to control for non-pecuniary job characteristics (working conditions) can generate
distortions. See Leibowitz, supra note 152, at 389 (discussing the importance and difficulties of
controlling for employee and employer characteristics).
154. See infra notes 156-57.
155. Id.
156. Susan N. Houseman, Why Employers Use Flexible Staffing Arrangements: Evidence from
an Establishment Survey, 55 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 149, 159, 161 (2001).
157.

MICHAEL K. LETTAU, COMPENSATION IN PART-TIME JOBS VERSUS FULL-TIME JOBS:

WHAT IFTHE JOB Is THE SAME?, I (Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Working Paper
No. 260, 1994).
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were actually working side by side.'58 This study confirms that lower
benefits may not translate into higher wages for part-time employees
even within the same establishment. This indicates within a single
workplace, full-time employees are part of the internal labor market, and
part-time employees should be viewed as external market employees.'5 9
Houseman's study attempts to explain why employers use
contingent work arrangements." 6° The need to adjust workload
fluctuations and to cope with staff absenteeism are among the reasons
given by employers to use contingent work arrangements.16 However,
Houseman finds the use of flexible staffing arrangement decreased labor
costs significantly even though not many employers stated this as a
driving factor.' 62 For three of the surveyed work arrangements, hourly
pay cost was about the same for regular employees in similar
positions.' 63 But when benefits costs were taken into account for all three
arrangements, the majority of establishments reported that hourly wage
cost plus benefit costs were lower for staffing arrangement employees
than for regular employees holding similar positions.' M This confirms
158. Id. Jobs from the same establishment and occupation were compared. The estimated parttime/full-time difference was true for the hourly wage component (-.164), hourly benefit cost
component (-.475) and total compensation per hour (-.227). Id. at 15, tbl.4A.
159. See Blank, supra note 121, at 270. After surveying the literature on the part-time/full-time
compensation disparity, Blank reaches several conclusions. First, part-time workers earn less than
full-time workers. Id. at 269. Second, the effect of part-time work on the probability of benefit
coverage clearly reveals that part-time workers are less likely to receive benefits, and if they do
receive benefits, the dollar amount of their benefit package is substantially lower than those of fulltime workers. Id. at 269-71.
160. Houseman, supra note 156, at 149. The following arrangements were surveyed:
temporary help agency workers, short-term hires (workers hired "directly by the organization for a
limited or specific period of time"), regular part-time employees, on-call workers ("called into work
only as needed") and contract workers (workers "who are employed by another organization to
perform tasks or duties as specifically contracted by the organization"). Id. at 151.
161. Id. at 149 (citing the additional reason that using agency temporaries and part-time
workers were useful screening methods for permanent positions).
162. Id. at 167. Only 11.5% of establishments specified that saving wages and benefits
motivated them to use THS workers (8.1% for short-term hires, 21.3% for part-time workers and
6.0% for on-call workers). Id. at 158 tbl.5. These are substantially lower than stated rates for other
reasons. For example, 47.0% and 52.2% of the establishments mentioned the need to fill in for
absent regular workers and the need of assistance in peak time, respectively, were driving them to
use THS workers. Houseman, supra note 156, at 158 tbl.5.
163. Id. at 159. Sixty-three point nine percent (63.9%) of establishments reported that hourly
pay for short-term hires was approximately the same for regular employees holding a similar
position (74.6% for part-time workers and 61.3% for on-call workers). Id. at 159 tbl.6. A noted
exception was the THS workers; 62.1% of the establishments reported that agency temps' hourly
pay was higher than regular employees holding a similar position. Id.
164. Id. Fifty-six point six percent (56.6%) of establishments reported that hourly pay plus
benefit cost was lower for short-term than for regular employees holding a similar position (62.9%
for part-time workers and 72.7% for on-call workers). Houseman, supra note 156, at 159 tbl.6.
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Lettau's findings that there are no compensating wage differentials for
the lack of benefits for part-time employees within the same
establishment.' 65 The fact that the disparity in compensation manifested
itself in the benefit portion of total compensation rather than hourly
wages166 supports the claim that many of these benefits represent fixed
costs and help entrench dual market practices. 161
In my view, non-eligible employees carry some of the costs of the
mandate. If the labor supply is inelastic, compensation rates are
determined mainly by labor demand and the competition among the
various employers over the existing supply of labor. Employer leverage
enables some of the costs of providing the benefit to be shifted to the
exempt sector.
Employers may prefer not to target the beneficiaries of the mandate
but rather to spread the costs of the mandate across the entire workforce.
This practice assists with the establishment of a well-compensated
internal market workforce that will reward employers with higher
productivity and a greater core of employee willingness to engage in
specific human capital attainment. Employers have a strong incentive in
that the non-beneficiary (non-covered) group of employees will carry
some of the benefits' cost burden. This advances the compensation
disparity between internal and external market workers. If employers
choose to target cost shifting to the beneficiaries of the mandated
benefit, no internal markets could be established because both
compensation packages would be equal in value.
Truman Bewley, in his well-publicized book 68 documents the
downward wage rigidities characterizing internal markets through
extensive interviews with managers.69 These rigidities manifest

Pertaining to THS employees, 38.3% of establishments reported lower compensation packages for
agency temps. Id.
165. Id.at162n.19.
166. This finding is also consistent with Lewis M. Segal & Daniel G. Sullivan, The Growth of
Temporary Services Work, 11J. ECON. PERSP. 117, 125-26 (1997) (documenting a small wage gap
but high benefit coverage gap for permanent versus THS employees).
167. The Miles and Autor studies did not address the compensation levels of THS employees
relative to regular permanent employees of the end users; they only report growth in the industry
employment rate in response to the judicial mandate. See Miles supra note 144; Autor supra note
143. But see Segal & Sullivan, supra note 166, at 126 (reporting a gap of 21.8% in the wages of
THS employees and permanent workers, but only a 3.1% wage gap after controlling for employees,
demographic and occupational characteristics; documenting substantially lower benefit coverage,
especially pertaining to health insurance).
168.

TRUMAN F. BEWLEY, WHY WAGES DON'T FALL DURING A RECESSION (Harvard Univ.

Press 1999).
169. Id. at 173-92.
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themselves in a reluctance by management to cut wages in the presence
of unemployment and an unwillingness to accept workers' underbidding
offers to work for less than the wages currently paid.'7 ° According to the
study, a major reason employers refuse to cut wages is the fear that wage
cuts will adversely affect employee morale and productivity.' 7 Bewley
reports that in the external market, these practices are not prevalent and
downward wage flexibility is very common. 7 2 These findings suggest
that, contrary to the assumptions of the standard price theory competitive
model, wages in the internal market are affected not only by demand and
supply conditions but are also impacted by workers' effort, work and
behavior. This means that, theoretically, employers could cut wages and
their employees would not withhold their labor,'73 but employers choose
not to do so in order to keep work morale and productivity intact. This
pattern perhaps explains why employers are targeting external market
employees in order to finance part of the benefits granted to internal
labor market employees. Downward wage rigidities in the internal
market motivates employers
to shift the costs of the benefit to external
74
labor market participants.
Studies pertaining to the use of contingent work arrangements
further suggest that one of the reasons employers contract out
employment is to differentiate their internal market employees from
their external market employees.'75 Although
non-unionized
establishments can offer better compensation packages to some workers
and not others, employers avoid this strategy for fear that perceptions of
inter-employee inequality will damage morale and productivity. 7 6 Using
non-standard employment arrangements, especially temporary agency
employees and contract workers who are not company employees, may

170. Id. at 173-74 (supporting efficiency wage models).
171. See Carl M. Campbell I & Kunal S. Kamlani, The Reasons for Wage Rigidity: Evidence
from a Survey of Firms, 112 Q. J. EcON. 759, 761 (1997) (reporting similar findings on usage
rigidities).
172. Bewley, supra note 168, ch. 17 (discussing secondary market behavior).
173. This confirms the claim that the labor supply curve is highly inelastic.
174. In summarizing his findings on external labor market employees Bewley notes that
Because of high turnover and heavy use of part-time labor, workers in the secondary
sector do not get to know one another well enough to make internal equity as important
as it is in the primary sector. For this reason, hiring pay is more flexible downward in the
secondary market than in the primary sector.
Bewley, supra note 168, at 326-27.
175. See, e.g., Segal & Sullivan, supra note 166, at 132-34 (explaining that the growth in the
use of THS employees is motivated by a need to establish a two-tier compensation structure);
Blank, supra note 121, at 259-61 (expanding this line of argument to all contingent practices).
176. See generally Bewley, supra note 168, chs. 6, 8.
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enable management to lower wages for these employees with minimal
adverse repercussions on core employee morale.'" Mandated benefits
programs that permit employers, on the one hand, to exclude secondary
market employees from coverage, and on the other hand, to depress their
wages in order to finance the cost of the mandate, provide a vehicle to
achieve the same objective that of sustaining intra-establishment dual
labor markets.
E. The RedistributionEffects of Variable Costs Mandated Benefits
The literature tends to group all employee benefits together and to
treat all of them as fixed labor costs. Some mandated benefits such as
unemployment insurance, payroll taxes for social security and workers
compensation are variable cost mandates.'78 Non-mandatory benefit
plans, such as sick leave, paid vacation and defined contribution pension
plans are also variable cost benefits.'7 9 Variable costs are prorated to cash
earnings and thus are incurred proportionally to the wage rate.
In theory, variable labor costs should not distort market decisions
on employment practices and the mix of hours and employment levels.' 8
Thus, from an intra-employee group distributional perspective, these
177. Katharine G. Abraham & Susan K. Taylor, Firms' Use of Outside Contractors: Theory
and Evidence, 14 J. LAB. EcON. 394, 397 (1996).
178. HAMERMESH, supra note 59, at 48.
179. Id.
180. Exceptions are variable overtime costs. The Fair Labor Relations Act (FLRA) requires, in
addition to the payment of a mandatory minimum wage, an overtime pay of one and a half for each
hour worked above the weekly maximum of 40 hours. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1) (1994). Approximately
70% of all workers are subject to the overtime pay provisions of FLRA. The mandate has two
objectives. One is to restrict the weekly hours an individual is working by taxing an employer who
works his employees above the maximum. This objective represents a concern for incumbent
employees. The other objective is to allow work sharing and to expand employment rates. As
employment is negatively correlated to the share of fixed labor costs, a countervailing force is
needed to mitigate the incentive to substitute hours for additional workers. Taxing overtime, may
encourage employers to employ additional workers at the standard wage, rather than to pay
incumbent employees overtime pay. There are continuous increases in the fixed cost share of total
compensation and therefore the deterring effect of the overtime mandate is decreased overtime.
Overtime pay is relevant mainly to minimum wage earners. Standard wages of workers earning
more than the minimum wage can be adjusted downward to keep the overall wage intact. Empirical
evidence supports the claim that overtime pay regulation has no discernible impact on overtime
hours because straight time hourly wages adjust partially to changes in overtime premium.
Employees in these organizations who do not engage in overtime work are made worse off, as their
standard wages are depressed. See generally Stephen J. Trejo, The Effects of Overtime Pay
Regulation on Worker Compensation, 81 AM. ECON. REV. 719 (1991); Stephen J. Trejo, Does the
Statutory Overtime Premium Discourage Long Workweeks, IZA Discussion Paper No. 373 (Oct.
2001), at
http://www.iza.org/en/webcontent/ProductFunctions/papers_discussions/1005575... /indexhtm.
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schemes are more equitable than fixed labor costs.' 8' Nonetheless,
variable costs may carry redistributive effects. An obvious effect is
added costs. When these costs cannot be shifted to covered employees in

the form of lower wages, as in the case of minimum wage mandates, the
textbook argument is that employment levels will fall whether in the
form of fewer hours worked or fewer workers working the same amount
of hours. This is the main distributional objection to minimum wage
mandates.' 2
Card and Krueger's study suggests that a modest increase in the
minimum wage does not result in a lower employment rate.'83 Putting
aside the controversy of whether these findings are plausible both on
empirical and theoretical grounds,'84 concentration should be placed on
the efficiency wage explanatory theory. One explanation to these
findings is that the minimum wage serves as an efficiency wage. s8 This
is an abstraction of the Shapiro-Stiglitz shirking model. 8 6 The ShapiroStiglitz model does not address minimum wage directly. It explores,
within the shirking model, how structural involuntary unemployment
can serve as the disciplining-productivity enhancing tool.' 87 The same
can be argued about mandatory minimum wage. Employees affected by
the new wage standard are deterred from shirking, as the costs of losing
one's job are higher. Less shirking results in higher productivity, which
can sustain the mandated wage increase without laying off incumbent
employees. In the minimum wage setting, wages do not adjust

181. Mitchell, supra note 50, at 306 (arguing that on equity grounds variable cost mandates
have more appeal). They do not distort employers' choices between hours and employment levels
and higher versus lower compensated employees.
182. See, e.g., Daniel Shaviro, The Minimum Wage, the Earned Income Tax Credit, and
Optimal Subsidy Policy, 64 U. CHI. L. REV 405, 406 (1997) (emphasizing that even if minimum
wage increases the earnings of low-wage workers as a group, it creates winners and losers among
that group and it benefits low-wage workers able to find and keep their job at the expense of those
who lose their job).
183. See DAVID CARD & ALAN B. KRUEGER, MYTH AND MEASUREMENT: THE NEW
ECONOMICS OF THE MINIMUM WAGE 389 (1995).
184. See Houseman, supra note 29, at 174-80, for a survey of a variety of studies supporting
the Card-Krueger finding of positive employment effects of a moderate increase in minimum wage
mandates, those rebutting the findings both on their empirical and theoretical soundness and those
studies finding that empirical data and theory are inconclusive.
185. James B. Rebitzer & Lowell J. Taylor, The Consequences of Minimum Wage Laws: Some
New Theoretical Ideas, 56 J. PUB. ECON. 245, 245 (1995) (demonstrating "that in a conventional
efficiency wage model, a minimum wage may increase the level of employment in low wage jobs").
186. Carl Shapiro & Joseph E. Stiglitz, supra note 68.
187. Structural involuntary unemployment is defined by Shapiro & Stiglitz as "a situation
where an unemployed worker is willing to work for less than the wage received by an equally
skilled employed worker, yet no job offers are forthcoming." Id. at 45 n. 1.
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downward due to legal constraints, while in the Shapiro-Stiglitz model,
wage rigidity is an outcome of a voluntary employer decision.
Assuming that this hypothesis is valid,' wage mandates still
redistribute wealth between groups of employees. If wage mandates
serve as efficiency wages, uncovered employees and the unemployed'89
serve as the external disciplinary labor market. External workers will not
be successful in attaining minimum wage paying jobs because if all
workers could successfully be employed in minimum wage jobs, paying
minimum wage would not enhance productivity.
All mandates that cannot be offset by wage decreases may be
operating as efficiency wages.' 9° Workers who value these benefits are
receiving more than the market-clearing wage albeit through regulation.
The uncovered sector and the unemployment waiting outside, in the
event of being laid off, are serving as the disciplinary secondary labor
market.
V.

CONCLUSION

Whether mandated employee benefit policies are efficient depends
on the ratio of the aggregate value attached by employees to the benefit
to the aggregate employer cost of providing the benefit. The higher the
aggregate value/cost ratio, the stronger the justification for implementing
the policy. High value/cost ratios are indicative of the existence of
market failures in the voluntary provision of the benefit.
Mandated benefits, efficient or not, do not entail employeremployee redistributive outcomes. The fact that no employment rate
changes can be traced following the enforcement of a mandate program
is usually indicative of full employer cost shifting. Policymakers treat
188. Houseman, supra note 29, at 171-80 (discussing a vast body of literature that is resisting
these findings).
189. Assuming that the rate of unemployment has not increased (because employers were able
to sustain the size of their workforce due to increased productivity) we are still facing the problem
of the existing unemployed. According to the Shapiro & Stiglitz definition of involuntary
unemployment, unemployment rates must have risen. Some individuals who were technically
counted as unemployed prior to the minimum wage increase were not involuntarily unemployed at
that stage. These individuals were, prior to the minimum wage increase, frictionally unemployed
(caught in transition between jobs or just entering the labor market) or unwilling to work at the
market wage rate and searching for above market wage jobs, but now are unable to find
employment at the new going minimum wage.
190. For minimum wage eamers, variable costs (and fixed costs) mandates cannot be offset by
lower wages and therefore, are transformed to wage mandates. Workers, who are paid the minimum
wage or near the minimum wage, obviously cannot have their wages adjusted to fully offset the
compensation increase caused by the mandates.
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the magnitude of cost shifting as a proxy of the value workers place on
the benefit, disregarding the fact that full cost shifting can also result
from the inelasticity of labor supply. When cost shifting occurs because
of the inelasticity of the labor supply, workers are simply carrying the
dead weight cost of the mandate.
From an intra-employee perspective, it seems apparent that the
public is mainly concerned with whether mandates are increasing the
unemployment rate. This is true of the minimum wage discourse and the
discussions pertaining to the prospects of mandatory employer-provided
health insurance. Again, it is assumed that if employment rates are
unharmed, the mandates are efficient and equitable because employees
are financing the cost of the benefit through decreased wages (health
insurance) or increased productivity (minimum wage).
The fact that employers do not respond to mandates by decreasing
total demand for labor does not rule out intra-employee redistribution.
Mandated benefit schemes, similar to voluntary benefit schemes,
reinforce dual labor market practices, in which exempt employees are to
some extent financing the costs of providing the benefit to covered
employees. This structure of cross-subsidy is efficient from the
employer's perspective. It raises productivity and commitment on the
part of internal workers. However, it increases compensation disparity
between internal and external labor market employees.
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